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Introduction
Discrete-choice models are increasingly used to analyze labor supply responses to policy reforms as they easily deal with non-convexities in agents'budget sets (Blundell and MaCurdy, 2000) . Indeed, tangency conditions are not required to hold as household objective functions are explicitly parameterized and maximized over a …nite set of possibilities, corresponding to commonly agreed durations of work. In contrast to the continuous approach (Hausman and Ruud, 1984) , discrete models impose in principle little constraint on preferences. In this note, we question whether these constraints are relaxed in practice.
To do so, we start from possibly the most ‡exible speci…cation. Assume that utility derived by household i from alternative j (= 1; :::; J) is given by:
It depends fundamentally on the level of household consumption C ij at choice j. In a static framework, this coincides with the disposable income obtained at H j hours of work, which is a complex function of labor income w i H j (worker's wage rate time her labor supply), other (exogenous) incomes and household characteristics, typically approximated by tax-bene…t microsimulation. Several e¤ects are associated with the j-th alternative, including disutility attached to working H j hours (or utility: some individuals may be workaholics), speci…c costs of work, job search costs, etc. These di¤erent e¤ects, captured by vector j , are not non-parametrically identi…ed. They may vary with a vector Z i of household characteristics and with unobserved heterogeneity v i :
This model retains the fundamental properties of structural models: (i) the assumption of utilitymaximizing behavior; (ii) the possibility to conduct welfare analysis (see Bargain, 2005) ; and (iii) the imposition of increasing monotonicity in consumption, which seem minimum requirements for meaningful policy analysis. 1 Yet, 'preferences' j may appear non-convex due to the presence of …xed costs, which militates in favor of relaxing usual regularity conditions on leisure/labor supply. 2 In contrast, in recent applications, the set of parameters is not speci…c to the quantity of labor supplied, that is, j = for all j. Instead, utility varies with the quantity of labor H j as follows:
with coe¢ cients interpreted as consumption-leisure preferences and typically speci…ed using quadratic 1 restrictions on Z i variables). That is, identi…cation rests on weak ground. Alternatively, it is possible to acknowledge these limitations and use the ‡exible model (U), which relaxes functional constraints and possibly improves …t. 3 In the following, we conduct Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests of the (nested) model (S) against (U). Both models can be estimated as multinomial logit under the standard assumption that the i.i.d. error term ij follows a I-EV distribution. The random component v i guarantees unrestricted substitution patterns between alternatives. We suggest several speci…cations with increasing degrees of ‡exibility. A popular form in the literature consists of a quadratic utility completed with …xed costs of work F ij (e.g., . This model (S1) is written for choice j = 1; :::; J:
Data and Speci…cation
with coe¢ cients c and h varying linearly with household characteristics Z i (Paris area, number of children in age groups 0-2, 3-5 and 6-11 and parents'age) and c also varying with the random component v i . Costs F ij are to be paid if labor supply is positive and vary with four household characteristics:
In a variant (S2), we account for possible childcare costs by making the coe¢ cient f 2 j for children aged 0-2 vary freely with the labor supply alternative. This conforms to the fact that childcare costs typically increase with the working time of mothers of children in that age group. 4 Note that variable costs of work are rarely used in practice; an exception is , who conduct a separate estimation of childcare costs.
The unconstrained model (U) is made comparable by use of the following quadratic form: 
Empirical Results
Estimates are presented and discussed in Bargain (2005) . They show in particular that interpreting the role of demographic characteristics is uneasy due to aforementioned identi…cation issues in structural models. 6 Fit and LR-tests are reported in Table 2 . According to the pseudo-R 2 , models (S1) and (S2) are outperformed by model (U). LR-tests con…rm that standard models are strongly rejected against the unconstrained speci…cation. To balance …t and parsimony, we report the Akaike's information criterion (AIC): model (U) still dominates in spite of a larger number of parameters. 5 Note that placing unobserved heterogeneity on the coe¢ cient of disposable income is a natural choice to make (S)models and the unconstrained model (U) directly comparable. Also, to be fair in our comparison, the random component is not alternative-speci…c in (U). In other words, additional ‡exibility is placed only on the deterministic part of this model. 6 For instance, the presence of young children a¤ects simultaneously work preferences and cost of work; it may also a¤ect the tax-bene…t function. However, model (U) bears the risk to capture idiosyncrasies of the data at use, especially because of the ‡exible way in which household characteristics Z i are introduced. We suggest a variant (U') which penalizes the model by forcing the interaction terms (the quadratic elements of c j (Z i )) not to vary with the labor supply alternatives. This restriction can be justi…ed by practical limitations due to 'curse of dimensionality'problems. We use a standard validation method that consists in estimating each model on a random 60% of the sample and check model performance on the 40% holdout sample. We …nd that (S1) and (S2) are also rejected against (U'). When repeating the exercise for smaller holdout samples, sample size may be too small to assume a chi-squared distribution of the LR statistic; comparisons of pseudo-R 2 nonetheless con…rm that the unconstrained model (U') outperforms (S1) and (S2). These results seem to indicate that better performances are not driven by sampling-error over…tting but, instead, that model (U) better captures the complexity of labor supply behavior.
Finally, Table 3 illustrates the potential di¤erences in model predictions for policy analysis. Wageelasticities are obtained by simulating a +1% wage increase for all women of the sample. The policy reform corresponds to the introduction of an in-work bene…t in France. Due to means-testing on joint income, this instrument discourages the labor supply of secondary earners (see or Bargain, 2005 , for more details). It appears that responses to wage shocks or policy reform are signi…cantly larger when evaluated using the unconstrained model compared to model (S2). With a thinner discretization (J=7), responses are slightly but not signi…cantly larger and, most importantly, the conclusions are identical, i.e., predictions of constrained and unconstrained models are signi…cantly di¤erent. 
Conclusion
This note shows that structural models currently used for policy evaluation may impose unnecessary constraints on household objective functions. Functional form restrictions also seem to a¤ect the magnitude of predicted labor supply responses to tax-bene…t reforms. We suggest a model where utility associated with the various hour choices depends on disposable income in a way that is totally independent across alternatives. Coe¢ cients are considered as an evaluation of preferences in which work costs are already captured, so that regularity conditions on leisure are relaxed. The model maintains a strict utilitymaximizing interpretation and usual regularity conditions on consumption while signi…cantly improving …t compared to standard speci…cations.
